Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt s.e.n.c.r.l./s.r.l.
Pour s’en convaincre, on n’a qu’à se référer au texte même du deuxième paragraphe de l’article 54.1 qui indique spécifiquement que la demande en justice manifestement mal fondée, frivole ou dilatoire peut constituer un abus:
L'abus peut résulter d'une demande en justice ou d'un acte de procédure manifestement mal fondé, frivole ou dilatoire, ou d'un comportement vexatoire ou quérulent. Il peut aussi résulter de la mauvaise foi, de l'utilisation de la procédure de manière excessive ou déraisonnable ou de manière à nuire à autrui ou encore du détournement des fins de la justice, notamment si cela a pour effet de limiter la liberté d'expression d'autrui dans le contexte de débats publics.
Dans le cadre de cette affaire, l’Honorable juge Dioysia Zerbisias en était venu à la conclusion que les procédures intentées par les demanderesses, dans lesquelles elles alléguaient le risque de confusion entre deux marques de commerce, étaient manifestement mal fondées :
 After taking into consideration all of the facts and surrounding circumstances, to impute the likelihood of confusion between Plaintiffs and Defendant's mark to the average consumer would insult him or hereby assuming that such consumer is completely devoid of intelligence; of normal powers of observation, recollection and recognition; or, is so totally unaware or uninformed as to the environment in which they are found, that they would be easily deceived about the origin or nature of the wares they purchase.
 For these reasons, therefore the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that there exists any confusion, or a likelihood of confusion between their trade-mark Oasis and that of Defendant, or, that there is any likelihood of depreciation of their mark by Defendant, and, that accordingly there has been an infringement of their rights by Defendant.
Or, même si la juge Zerbisias constate qu’il n’y a pas eu abus de la procédure au sens de Viel (elle note spécifiquement qu’il n’y a eu aucunes procédures interlocutoires superflues), elle prend note du fait que les demanderesses ne pouvaient ignorer le mal fondé de leurs procédures, lesquelles semblent avoir été déposées dans le seul but d’intimider la défenderesse :
 Plaintiffs' action was preceded by a menacing letter dated January 25, 2005 demanding compliance by Defendant to Plaintiffs' demands. Seventeen (17) months later the injunction action was filed, the conclusions of which, as instituted, were daunting. In the conclusions and notwithstanding that Defendant had denied Plaintiffs' demands, by letter dated February 8, 2005, Plaintiffs sought orders against Defendant, and its directors, officers, employees, agents to:
• cease using the trade-mark Olivia's Oasis in any form;
• cease drawing the attention of the public to its business or products;
• cease using the trade-mark Olivia's Oasis on all promotional, commercial, packaging materials, stationery, etc. and to proceed to the destruction of all such materials;
• disclose the name of all retailers to whom its products had been sold, the persons dealt with, with a detailed description of each sale;• recall all of its merchandise and promotional materials;
• render a detailed accounting of all its business activities, including its revenues and expenses, from the commencement of its operations;
• pay over to Plaintiffs all of its profits earned since the commencement of its business activities;
• pay punitive damages of $20,000;
• cease all proceedings to register its trade-mark with the Registrar of Trade-marks, and to withdraw its pending application;
• change its corporate name and to withdraw therefrom the word Oasis.
 Faced with such intimidating conclusions, Defendant had a very serious case to meet. The action represented a serious threat to its existence and business activities, the defence of which required time, energy, financial resources and organisation to succeed.
 It is also obvious from the record and evidence that Plaintiffs unnecessarily pursued a claim they knew or should have known would not succeed. It should have been clear to Plaintiffs from the gaping visual dissimilarities between the trade-marks; the gaping divergence in the nature of the wares, one being edible, the other being non-edible, and, their placement in different areas of the same channels of sale; the difference in the targeted clientele; the fact that they knew there had been no instances of confusion; and from their admission that they had suffered no damages as a result of the concurrent sale of Defendant's products over a period of some five years.
 In the circumstances of the present case the Court concludes that Plaintiffs, using their economic power and experience used a shotgun approach to attack Defendant simultaneously on several fronts with their full might, attempting by the present proceedings to intimidate and thwart Defendant from its legitimate use of its trade name and trade-mark. Obviously Plaintiffs expected that, given the threat which the action represented to Defendant's very corporate existence, given that Defendant was still a fledgling business, given the projected cost of such proceedings and, given the obvious disparity in the respective power and resources of the parties, that Defendant would retreat and succumb to their demands, and cease using its mark and change its corporate name or, perhaps would ensure its survival and avoid an economically and resource draining battle by signing a licensing agreement with Plaintiffs - as others have done in the past.
 Such menacing and abusive conduct cannot be condoned with impunity.
La juge Zerbisias condamne donc les demanderesses à payer un montant de 100 000$ pour les honoraires extrajudiciaires encourus par la défenderesse et 25 000$ en dommages et intérêts punitifs.
Le texte intégral du jugement est disponible ici : http://bit.ly/anI3Xt